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tional policy of free alienability. The attorney would simply
advise his clients that they can agree that no stock can be
transferred without offering it for a dollar to the other stockholders, explaining that this constitutes no 'forfeiture' or no
'prohibition' because there is a ready escape, i.e., in the event
that the other stockholders do not elect to purchase at a dollar, the selling stockholder is free to sell. Such a result it is
submitted, would represent a solid victory of form over sub24
stance, legal niceties over logic and common sense.
Apparently form has triumphed over substance in the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania. This decision now makes it possible for first option
agreements to provide in effect that if the corporation or other stockholders do not desire to have a gift made to them, the shareholder
wishing to dispose of his stock is free to sell it on the open market.

EMINENT DoMAIN-Reasonable Probability of Rezoning-Valuation

testimony may be premised upon a reasonable probability of rezoning-Evidence supporting the probability must not be remote or speculative.
Snyder v. Commonwealth, 412 Pa. 15, 192 A.2d 650 (1963).
Under the power of eminent domain, an unimproved parcel of land
owned by George Snyder and Edward Boone was condemned by the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania for highway purposes. This property contained 1 7/10 acres and was zoned residential at the time of
the taking.
Being dissatisfied with the Commonwealth's offer of compensation,
the plaintiffs petitioned for appointment of a board of viewers to hear
testimony and make an award of damages for the taking. The board
of viewers awarded plaintiffs $12,745.37. Both sides appealed to the
Court of Common Pleas where the jury returned a verdict of
$40,000.00 plus $7400.00 for delay in payment.
The Commonwealth appealed from the jury award, arguing that
the condemnee should not have been permitted to introduce evidence
of market value which was based on the theory that the property
had a reasonable probability of being rezoned at the time of the taking. The main thrust of this argument being that there was not suf24.

BRmF FOR APPELLANrS, p. 19.

DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2: p. 119

ficient evidence offered to indicate any likelihood of rezoning with
respect to this property.1
Without discussing the evidence that was offered on this question,
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the reasonable probability of rezoning was a question of fact and that there was sufficient
2
evidence to support the probability in this case.
However, the dissent of Justice Cohen, concurred in by Chief Justice Bell and Justice Eagen, was in complete agreement with the
Commonwealth's position that the evidence on the likelihood of a
change in zoning was insufficient. Justice Cohen, in commenting on
the lack of facts to support the probability of rezoning, stated that,
"....

in order for evidence of a possible zoning change to be admis-

sible, the prospect of repeal or amendment of the zoning ordinance
' 3
must be reasonably probable and not speculative or remote.
At trial, plaintiffs contended that, had the land not been condemned, there was a reasonable probability that it would have been
rezoned to a higher use classification. The plaintiffs' valuation witness was permitted to give an opinion that there was a trend in
favor of institutional and commercial use of those properties along
Route 22 in Churchill Borough where the plaintiffs' property was located. His opinion of market value of the Snyder tract was based on
the theory that this land had a reasonable probability of being rezoned at the time of the taking.
The following evidence was submitted by the plaintiffs to support
the probability; Churchill Borough had willingly made a change of
zoning from residential to institutional to accomodate a large research laboratory. The research property and the plaintiffs' property were 1/8 of a mile apart, both fronting on Route 22. There was
a limited amount of usable undeveloped land along Route 22 in the
Churchill Borough area. Many commercial establishments were
erected along this highway in the municipalities to the east and west
of Churchill Borough.
The Commonwealth offered evidence indicating that there was no
probability of a zoning change for the Snyder property. All of
Churchill Borough had been zoned residential for at least ten years,
and, except for the laboratory property and a water authority property, there had been no zoning changes. In 1957, the proper authorities of Churchill Borough had refused to rezone the property adjoin1. Brief for Appellant, p. 12, Snyder v. Commonwealth, 412 Pa. 15, 192
A.2d 650 (1963).
2. Snyder v. Commonwealth, 412 Pa. 15, 20, 192 A.2d 650, 652 (1963).
3.

Id. at 24, 192 A.2d at 654.
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ing that of the plaintiffs. There were no commercial enterprises anywhere in Churchill Borough and the residential growth in Churchill
Borough had been substantial for six or eight years prior to the
condemnation.
Although it is the general rule that evidence of value premised
upon a proscribed use is inadmissible, 4 a well-recognized exception to
this rule, never before considered by an appellate court of Pennsylvania, states that a reasonably probable change in the zoning restriction may be considered in arriving at fair market value, if the change
would have an appreciable influence on that value; the exception
further requires that such a possible zoning change must not be remote or speculative.5
Admittedly, the existence or non-existence of a reasonable probability of rezoning is a question of fact, 6 but it is submitted that the
evidence to support the probability must meet the usual evidentiary
standards of the law in order to be admissible at all. As was stated
by the California court:
If there is to be a showing of a reasonable probability of
a change in the zoning of a property to be condemned, the
evidence must at least be in accordance with the usual minimum evidentiary requirements, and that which is purely
speculative, wholly guesswork and conjectural, is not admis7
sible.
The Maryland court also discussed the insufficiency of evidence,
stating:
[I]t would, we think, have been entirely in order for the
trial court to have instructed the jury as to the insufficiency
of such evidence and to have stated that no element or
enhancement of market value could be based upon the mere
possibility that at some time in the future a reclassification
might occur.8
Authorities on eminent domain, Nichols, Eminent Domain (3rd
rev. ed. 1962) and Orgel, Valuation Under Eminent Domain (2d ed.
1963) do not indicate the minimum evidentiary requirements for the
admissibility of valuation premised upon the reasonable probability
4.

4 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 12.322 (3rd rev. ed. 1962).

5.

Id. at § 12.322 (1).
Supra note 2.

6.

7. Redondo Beach School Dist. v. Flodine, 163 Cal. App. 2d 437, 448, 314
P.2d 581, 587 (1957).
8.
(1957).

State Roads Comm'n v. Warrimer, 211 Md. 480, 486, 128 A.2d 248, 251
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of rezoning. Nichols only states that the evidence to support the
probability "must not be remote or speculative." 9
Other jurisdictions, although admitting a variety of evidence on
the question, do not refer specifically to what minimum standards
this type of evidence must meet to be admissible. But they do give
some indication of what the minimum evidentiary standards should
be.
For example, in Matter of Village of Garden City 1 ° the evidence
indicated that, while the subject property was zoned residential, an
adjoining property and properties across the street were zoned commercial. Also, for a three year period prior to the condemnation the
Village of Garden City had under study a change in zoning of this
parcel and others in the immediate area. The condemnee's property
was not properly zoned and was not suitable for residential use, as
this particular area was primarily developed commercially. A change
of zoning of the subject property would not have been inconsistent
with the general character of this vicinity or the village as a whole.
Supporting the reasonable probability theory in Masten v. State"'
was evidence of a number of commercial establishments existing in
the neighborhood before the appropriation and a large number of
variances from residential restrictions being granted before and after
the condemnation. A comprehensive zoning revision, under study
for approximately a year before the taking, was put into effect three
years after the appropriation. The court recognized the probative
value of the numerous variances granted, but noted that "isolated
variances granted in the exercise of discretion ... have little or no
probative force .... -12
In People v. Donovan' 3 there was evidence that the condemnee's
property was adjacent to a rapidly expanding governmental center
and that several properties situated similarly and zoned residential
had been sold for inflated prices for non-residential uses. At the
date of the condemnation the city was considering rezoning the area,
but had temporarily rejected any changes. There was expert testimony which indicated that properties lying between the subject property and the governmental center had a reasonable probability of
being rezoned and that this possibility existed to a somewhat lesser
9. Supra note 5.
10. 9 Misc. 2d 693, 167 N.Y.S. 2d 166, aff'd, 4 App. Div. 2d 783, 165 N.Y.S.2d
1022, appeaZ denied, 3 N.Y.2d 708 (1956).
11. 11 App. Div. 2d 370, 206 N.Y.S.2d 672, aff'd, 9 N.Y. 796 (1960).
12.
13.

Id. at 372, 206 N.Y.S.2d at 674.
57 Cal. 2d 346, 369 P.2d 1 (1962).
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degree for the subject property. The court, in admitting valuation
testimony premised on a probability of rezoning, stated that, "The
reasonable probability of a zoning change may be shown by a variety
of factors including neighborhood changes and general changes in
land use." 14 In view of the evidence that was offered on this question,
it appears obvious that the court was referring to "neighborhood
changes and general changes in land use" in the particular area in
close proximity to the Donovan property and within the same municipality in which it was located.
These three cases 1 5 indicate that the evidence relied upon must
first and foremost refer to circumstances existing within the particular area where the property in question is located; further, that the
evidence must concern the situation within the municipality which
imposed the restrictions upon the property in question. This appears
to be the very minimum common denominator of the evidence sufficient to support valuation testimony which is premised upon the
reasonable probability of rezoning.
But, a large quantity of this type of evidence will not necessarily
meet the burden of proof, unless it indicates some basis from which
to draw a conclusion that the zoning change was reasonably probable.
In City of Euclid v. Lakeshore C0.16 the evidence showed that the
property across the boulevard was zoned commercial and used commercially and that there was commercial zoning and use on the same
side of the boulevard two blocks from the subject property. There
had been a few adjustments to a different class of commercial zoning
on the other side of the boulevard, but the neighborhood was experiencing a general residential growth. The court refused to admit
market value testimony which was premised upon a probability of
rezoning. The court placed considerable importance on the condemnor's argument that the zoning ordinance had been in effect for
twenty-seven years and had, almost without change, maintained the
residential character of this area throughout this period. The court
felt that the past history of this zoning ordinance indicated that there
was little possibility of any change in the future which would be
inconsistent with the general character of this area.
7
The condemnee in the case of In re Armory Site in Kansas City 1
offered evidence indicating that across the street from his residen14. Id. at 353, 369 P.2d at 4.
15. Matter of Village of Garden City, 9 Misc. 2d 693, 167 N.Y.S.2d 166,
aff'd. 4 App. Div. 2d 783, 165 N.Y.S.2d 1022, appeal denied, 3 N.Y.2d 708 (1956);
Masten v. State, 11 App. Div. 2d 370, 206 N.Y.S.2d 672, aff'd, 9 N.Y. 796 (1960);
People v. Donovan, 57 Cal. 2d 346, 369 P.2d 1 (1962).
16. 102 Ohio App. 96, 133 N.E.2d 372 (1956).
17. 282 S.W.2d 464 (Mo., 1955).
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tially zoned land and in the immediate neighborhood there were
structures which were not consistent with residential zoning. The
court in rejecting this evidence said, "Merely presenting evidence that
nearby there exist buildings other than those permitted by the present zoning regulation is not sufficient to remove from the realm of
speculation the possibility of a change in the zoning regulation ..

."1s

The evidence in the Snyder case did not approach the standards in
the case of City of Euclid v. Lakeshore Co.' 9 and probably not even
those of In re Armory Site in Kansas City20 where the evidence was

very meager; the court in both cases rejected the reasonable probability arguments. In the Snyder case two zoning changes over a
period of ten years were the only evidence directly referrable to
Churchill Borough which might have indicated a possibility of rezoning; this evidence did not even refer to the particular area in
which the Snyder property was located. As noted in Masten v.
State,2 1 one or two zoning changes have very little probative value.
The balance of the evidence presented on this question referred to
other areas which were located in municipalities adjacent to or a few
miles distant from Churchill Borough.
There were no indications that any type zoning change was wanted
or needed by Churchill Borough, 2 2 or that the present zoning was
inconsistent with the natural development of this area, 2 3 or that the
zoning in the Snyder case was arbitrary and not in good faith, 2 4 or
25
inconsistent with the general character of Churchill Borough.
This is not to say that extrinsic evidence would have no value on
the question of the reasonable probability of rezoning, but to suggest
that the admissibility of market value based on a probability of rezoning must depend on evidence which concerns the particular municipality and area of interest. If there is no such evidence, any val18.

Id. at 471.

19.

Supra note 16.

20. Supra note 17.
21. Supra note 12.
22.

"[I]f It appears reasonably probable to the trial judge that the wants

and needs of the particular community may result, within a reasonable time, in
the lifting of restrictions, he should admit testimony of present value based on

prospective use of the property for purposes not then available." City of Austin
v. Cannizzo, 267 S.W.2d 808, 815 (1954).
23. Long Beach City High School Dist. v. Stewart, 30 Cal. 2d 763, 770, 185
P.2d 585, 589 (1947).
24. Ibid.
25. Masten v. State, 11 App. Div. 2d 370, 371, 206 N.Y.S.2d 672, 673 (1960).
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uation testimony premised on a reasonable probability of rezoning
should be rejected.
The condemnee in an eminent domain proceeding has the right to
just compensation, interpreted by the courts to mean fair market
value. But fair market value does not include remote possibilities
under the mistaken application of the rule of reasonable probability
of rezoning. The rule requires evidence which refers to that area in
the particular political subdivision in which the condemned property
is located. The evidence introduced in Snyder v. Commonwealth does
not appear to fit this standard.

ToRTs-Illegitimacy-Illegitimate v. Father-To cause one to be
born into the world as an illegitimate constitutes a tortious act-no
remedy for injuries resulting from this act will be granted.
Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E. 2d 849 (1963).
The defendant is the father of the infant plaintiff. The plaintiff's
mother was induced by the defendant to have sexual relations with
him by a promise of marriage. Because the defendant was already
married, this promise could not be kept.' As a result, the plaintiff
is an illegitimate child. This suit was brought by the plaintiff to
recover damages for his illegitimacy. 2 The suit was dismissed by the
Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, for failure to state a cause of
action. The Supreme Court of Illinois refused to take the case, and
transferred it to the Appellate Court which affirmed the lower court's
decision.8
1. The plaintiff's mother had no knowledge that the defendant was married
at the time of the act of coition, and therefore, she was a victim of the defendant's fraud.
2. The plaintiff sought damages for the deprivation of his right to be a
legitimate child, to have a normal home, to have a legal father, to inherit from
his paternal ancestors and for being stigmatized as a bastard.
3. According to Illinois Law not all cases can be appealed directly to the
Supreme Court of Illinois.
ILL. REV. STAT. 1961, ch. 110, § 75.
(1)
Appeals shall be taken directly to the Supreme Court
(a) in all cases in which a franchise or freehold or the validity
of a statute or a construction of the constitution is involved,
(b) in all cases relating to revenue, or in which the State Is
interested as a party or otherwise and (c) in cases in which the
validity of a municipal ordinance or county zoning ordinances

